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The literature is inconclusive as to whether Marshallian specialization or Jacobian diversification 
externalities favour regional innovativeness. The specialization argument poses that regional 
specialization towards a particular industry improves innovativeness in that industry. Regional 
specialization allows for knowledge to spill over among similar firms. By contrast, the 
diversification thesis asserts that knowledge spills over between firms in different industries, 
causing diversified production structures to be more innovative. Building on an original database, 
we address this controversy for the Netherlands. We thereby advance on the literature by providing 
a two-level approach, at the region’s and the firm’s level. At the regional level, we compare 
specialized with diversified regions on numbers of accommodated innovators. At the firm level, we 
establish causalities between externalities and degree of innovativeness. The results suggest 
Marshallian externalities: specialized regions accommodate increased numbers of innovating firms 
and, consistently, incumbent firms’ innovativeness increase with regional specialization. Once the 
product has been launched, innovators in diversified Jacobian regions prove more successful in 
commercial terms than innovators in specialized Marshallian regions.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
Firms’ location decisions are the outcome of a search for a match between the firm’s 
requirements and the endowments provided by the respective regions. As to the 
innovator’s need to create and sustain a competitive knowledge base, the literature 
remains inconclusive as to whether specialized or diversified regions are conducive. 
The Marshallian specialization hypothesis asserts that regions with production 
structures specialized towards a particular industry tend to be more innovative in that 
particular industry. The Jacobian diversification hypothesis, by contrast, argues that 
diversified production structures favour regional innovativeness.  
        Generally, two levels of analysis are adopted in attempting to address this 
controversy. Studies at the regional level can be distinguished from those at the firm 
level. At the regional level, specialized and diversified regions are compared on 
numbers of accommodated innovators. These are expected to increase with the merits 
of either type of externalities. At the firm level, causalities are established between 
externalities and innovative performance of the individual firm. The advantages of 
each type of externalities would be resembled by the innovation performance of firms 
in either specialized or diversified regions.  
    Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, unique data allow for adopting 
both levels of analysis simultaneously. We analyse regional counts and individual 
firm performance. In adopting this two-level approach, new evidence is provided to 
build the case for both Marshallian or Jacobian externalities. Second, the paper builds 
on an original database of innovators compiled by screening 43 specialist trade 
journals for new-product-announcements. These data are more appropriate for 
industrial clusters research than traditional databases, for reasons to be discussed 
below. Moreover, the data allow us to distinguish between technological and   3
commercial success. Third, our analysis deals with the Netherlands, where the 
homogeneity across the regions regarding general business conditions allows us to 
measure knowledge externalities more accurately than in case of a large and 
heterogeneous country like the United States (see among other Feldman & Audretsch 
1999). 
The arguments for the specialization and diversification hypotheses are briefly 
discussed in section 2. The data collection procedure is described in section 3. In 
section 4 the modeling framework is presented. The empirical results are shown and 
discussed in section 5, followed by conclusions in section 6. 
 
2. Specialization and diversification externalities 
Externalities are defined as economies of scale external to the firm. An increase in 
industry-wide output within a given geographical area decreases average costs for the 
individual firm. The 'Industrial District-argument’, put forward by Marshall (1890), 
asserts that spatial concentration of production may sustain asset-sharing, the 
provision of specific goods and services by specialized suppliers and a local labour 
market pool. A local concentration of production is therefore expected to reduce the 
production costs incurred by individual firms in the cluster.  
    In this paper we focus on externalities related to the individual firms’ ability to 
create and sustain a competitive knowledge base. Newly-created knowledge can be 
appropriated only to a limited extent and may spill over to other firms. By ''working 
on similar things and hence benefiting much from each others' research'' (Griliches 
1979), knowledge spillovers increase the stock of knowledge available for each 
individual firm. Knowledge spillovers relate to the dissemination of tacit knowledge. 
As opposed to codified knowledge, tacit knowledge is ill-documented, uncodified and   4
can only be acquired through the process of social interaction. Hence knowledge 
spillovers are limited in geographic scope and bounded to the region where the new 
economic knowledge is originally created (Feldman & Audretsch 1999). The concept 
of knowledge spillovers is generally acknowledged as an important determinant of 
regional innovation dynamics (Karlsson & Manduchi 2001).  
    There are two competing hypotheses on the nature of these externalities. As put 
forward by Marshall (1890), Arrow (1962), and Romer (1986), and later formalized 
by Glaeser et al. (1992) as the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) model, the 
specialization hypothesis argues that knowledge tends to be industry-specific. 
Consequently, spillovers are expected to arise between firms within the same industry 
and can only be supported by regional concentrations of similar industries. These 
intra-industry spillovers are known as localization or 'specialization’ externalities. By 
contrast, the alternative hypothesis asserts that knowledge spills over between 
complementary rather than similar industries. As argued by Jacobs (1969), the 
exchange of complementary knowledge across diverse firms and economic agents 
facilitates search and experimentation in innovation. A diversified regional production 
structure is therefore expected to increase the stock of knowledge available for the 
individual firm and gives rise to urbanization or 'diversification' externalities.  
    Several empirical studies set out to address the controversy. Using patent data for 
Italy, Paci and Usai (1999) establish that both specialization and diversification 
externalities positively affect regional innovativeness, the latter being more 
pronounced for high technology industries and metropolitan environments. Shefer and 
Frenkel (1998) arrive at similar conclusions for Israel, though only for high 
technology sectors; low technology sectors are not affected by externalities. By 
contrast, Feldman and Audretsch (1999) argue that diversification rather than   5
specialization externalities foster regional innovative activity in the United States. 
Numbers of new-product announcements even tend to be lower in specialized regions. 
This corroborates with Kelly and Hageman (1999): ''the location of Research and 
Development (R&D) is determined more by the location of other sectors' innovation 
than by the location of its own production''. Using R&D labour costs data for the 
Netherlands, Van Oort (2002) also establishes diversification externalities for 
innovation in manufacturing industries, as do Ouwersloot and Rietveld (2000). 
    A closely related debate is on the impact of local market structure on innovative 
behaviour. The Marshallian model holds that local market power of firms in the 
labour market favours innovation. Local monopoly restricts the flow of ideas to others 
and maximizes the innovating firm’s capability to appropriate the innovation rents 
(Glaeser et al. 1992). Jacobs (1969), by contrast, asserts that local competition is an 
incentive to engage in innovation. Jacobs' (1969) concept of local competition is 
substantially different from the traditional notion of competition on product markets. 
It evolves around the struggle for ideas. The local firms' competition for ideas, which 
are embodied in individual employees, is determined by the industry-specific firm-
employment ratio: the more firms per employee, the better individuals are enabled to 
pursue and implement new ideas. Feldman & Audretsch (1999) observe that, 
consistent with Jacobs' (1969) hypothesis, local competition positively affects 
innovative activity. For the Netherlands, Van Oort (2002) establishes that, consistent 
with the Marshallian model, local competition hampers innovation.    6
3. Collection of data 
 
For the purpose of this paper we compiled an innovation database. The data have been 
collected using the Literature-based Innovation Output (LBIO) method. The LBIO 
method has been used by several authors like Edwards and Gordon (1984), Acs and 
Audretsch (1988) for the USA, Kleinknecht et al (1993) for the Netherlands, Cogan 
(1993) for Ireland, Coombs et al (1996) for the United Kingdom and Santarelli, 
Piergiovanni (1996) for Italy and Flor and Oltra (2004) for Spain. The method has 
several advantages. First, as opposed to traditional indicators like R&D labour costs, 
it is a direct innovation output indicator, i.e. it measures the market introduction of 
new products. Second, as opposed to patent statistics, the LBIO method also retrieves 
data on innovations that are not patented. Third, the LBIO-method also accounts for 
the population of young and small firms. These are insufficiently covered by 
traditional indicators: LBIO data are among the most comprehensive of those using 
secondary data (Flor and Oltra 2004). A drawback associated with the LBIO method 
is that the probability to announce a new product in a journal need not be equal for all 
firms and products. 
        Two volumes of forty-three trade journals have been screened for new-product 
announcements. The screening method excluded advertisements. Only 
announcements in the editorial sections of the journals have been taken into account. 
In the editors’ expert opinion these products apparently embody a surplus value over 
previous versions or substitutes. In order to further reduce the risk of counting mere 
product differentiations, the announcements were required to report at least one 
characteristic feature of superiority over previous versions or substitutes concerning 
functionality, versatility or efficiency. During September 2000 – August 2002 we   7
counted 1,585 new-product-announcing firms located in the Netherlands and sent 
these a questionnaire in order to obtain additional information on the firm and its 
innovation activities. 1,056 firms responded, of which 658 firms reported to have 
imported the innovation. These 658 cases have been omitted: As we are interested in 
in-house developed innovations we use the remaining 398 cases for further analysis. 
These 398 firms have been re-contacted two years after product launch in order to 
obtain information on the commercial viability of the product.  
    Referring to the issue of sample representativeness, we compared our LBIO sample 
to the Dutch Community Innovation Survey (CIS). As to the distribution of innovators 
across industries, both databases run parallel and are significantly correlated.
1 This 
result can be considered reassuring. Relative to the CIS data, the LBIO database 
comprises many small firms. This bias towards small firms is accounted for by a 
minimum size restriction of 10 employees applied in the CIS database. Controlling for 
this threshold, both databases take on similar size distributions.  
    The 398 surveyed firms show much concern for innovation as more than eighty 
percent report to engage in research activities on a continuous basis, rather than only 
occasionally. Approximately three out of every four announcements refer to products 
new to the industry rather than new to the firm only. Half the firms with in-house 
developed innovations reported to have applied for patents. In terms of R&D 
expenses and new-product turnover, the firms identified in the LBIO database are no 
less innovative than those in the CIS (see Table 1).   8
 
Table 1. Comparison of Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and LBIO data. 
     CIS  LBIO 
R&D intensity    Mean  7  8.9 
   Median  2.2  5 
   Sd  66.7  12.9 
       
R&D output  Improved  Mean  20.8  23.3 
   Median  15  20 
   Sd  20.7  16.1 
       
 New  Mean  11.3  24.1 
   Median  8  20 
   Sd  14.6  20.51 
       
patents Yes    28.3%  51.3% 
 No    71.7%  48.7% 
       
R&D activities  Permanently    72.0%  82.2% 
 Occasionally    28.0%  17.8% 
 
In order to address the Marshall – Jacobs controversy, we examine the merits of 
specialization and diversification externalities at the regional and firm level. At the 
regional level, we examine whether the Marshallian model (specialization 
externalities and local market power) or Jacobian model (diversification externalities 
and local competition) can explain regional innovativeness in the Netherlands.
2 More 
specifically, we test whether regions endowed with specialized or diversified 
production structures accommodate more innovators. The count of innovators is 
regressed on three regional production structure characteristics: (1) degree of 
specialization, (2) degree of diversification and (3) degree of competition. The 398 
innovators are disaggregated at the 2-digit postal code level, subdividing the 
Netherlands into 98 regions. Industries are disentangled at the 2-digit SIC-level, 
distinguishing 58 industries.  
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4. Model operationalization 
 
Feldman & Audretsch (1999) and Paci & Usai (1999) are followed in using the 
production structure specialization index (PS) to measure Marshallian specialization 
externalities. Based on employment data,
3 the PS-index measures the extent to which 





where  i = 1..58 industries 
  j = 1..98 postal code regions 
           E = employment 
The PSij variable is a location coefficient, measuring the share of employment 
accounted for by industry i in region j, relative to this industry's share in national 
employment. High PSij-values imply regional specialization externalities in industry i. 
Specialization and diversification externalities are, however, not mutually exclusive; 
any diversified region may also accommodate the larger part of a particular industry, 
leaving the region both diversified and specialized simultaneously. We therefore need 
an additional measure of diversification externalites, taking into account the 
employment distribution across all industries in the region; a separate coefficient 
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where sij is the share of industry i’s employment in region j and skj is the share of 
industry k’s employment in region j; n is the number of industries, s
−
j is the mean of 
the shares. The Gini-coefficient measures for each postal region j the area between a 
45 degrees line and a Lorenz curve. This curve is derived by ranking sij in ascending 
order and plotting its cumulative values to the cumulative values of employment. An 
index close to one implies that employment in a region is strongly concentrated in one 
industry. If a region is characterized by an equal distribution of industries’ 
employment, the Gini-coefficient equals zero. For ease of interpretation, we proceed 
with the complement of the Gini-coefficient, GINICj, defined as (1-GINIj). GINICj 
varies between 0 and 1 and associates larger values with diversified local production 
structures, indicating Jacobian externalities.
4 
    The degree of local competition is measured by the competition coefficient COMP: 
where i, j and Eij are defined as in (1) and FIRMSij = total number of firms, whether 
innovative or not.
5 The COMPij variable relates the number of firms per worker per 
industry i in region j to its national equivalent and refers to Jacobs' (1969) notion of 
labour market competition. High values are associated with fierce competition 
between local firms for labour, low values indicate less fierce local labour market 
competition (Glaeser et al. 1992; Feldman & Audretsch 1999). Alternatively, the 
values for COMPij can be read in terms of average firm size. Values smaller than 1 
relate to large average firm size relative to the industries’ national equivalent and 
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Romer (MAR) model, small values for COMPij suggest local market power enabling 
the innovator to appropriate the innovation rents (Glaeser et al. 1992; Feldman & 
Audretsch 1999).  
    As  emphasized  by  Jaffe et al. (1993), the propensity for innovations to cluster 
geographically differs by industry simply because the location of production is more 
concentrated in some industries than in others. To control for total firm population, 
the variable FIRMSij introduced in the COMPij variable is re-introduced into the 
model as an autonomous control variable. Equation (4) summarizes the regional level 
analyses: 
     
 
Summing up, the Marshallian model (specialization externalities and local market 
power) will be suggested by both a positive coefficient for PSij and a negative 
coefficient for COMPij. The Jacobian model (diversification externalities and local 
competition) will be validated by positive estimates for both GINICj and COMPij.  
 
    The regional analyses are extended with firm level analyses. These examine the 
impact of Marshallian and Jacobian externalities on the individual firms’ innovation 
activities. We use four different dependent variables, providing a comprehensive 
description of innovative behaviour of the individual firm. The first variable is 
defined as the share of total sales generated with (re)newed products and measures 
innovation output. Variable two is also a measure of innovation output and takes on 
the value 1 if the product announced can be considered radically new and 0 for 
incrementally improved innovations. Variables three and four deal with the propensity 
to participate in innovation networks. Variable three takes on the value 1 if the 
 Number of innovatorsij = f (Regional specializationij, Regional diversificationj          (4) 
                                             competitionij, firm populationij)   12
product announced is developed in partnership, 0 otherwise. Variable four denotes the 
number of partners involved in developing the product announced.  
    In examining the effect of externalities (PSij and GINICj variables) on innovative 
behaviour we control for general firm characteristics. The first control variable is firm 
size in terms of employment (SIZE). Large firms are expected to produce more 
innovative output as they have more means at their disposal to innovate. The variable 
RD measures the R&D-intensity, i.e. the share of R&D expenditures in total sales. 
Innovative output can be expected to increase with R&D spending. The variable 
AUTONOMY distinguishes between dependent and autonomous firms. Dependency 
affects the ability to realize innovative output. A dependent firm might not have the 
capability or permission to develop innovative products on its own. The share of 
export in total sales (EXPORT) is expected to affect the share of new products in total 
sales positively. Exporting firms are exposed to competition in global product 
markets, which provokes a tendency to innovate. A dummy MANUFACTURING that 
takes on the value 1 if the firm is manufacturing, 0 otherwise, accounts for the 
industry structure of the sample. Equation (5) summarizes the firm level analyses: 
  
 
    
Two years after market launch, we re-contacted the 398 firms in order to obtain 
information on the extent to which the announced products have been successful in 
commercial terms. A Likert-scale has been applied, which measures product 
performance relative to its initial expectations. The scale distinguishes between 
‘below expectations’ (40%), ‘as expected’ (35%) and ‘above expectations’ (25%).    
Determinants of commercial viability differ from those explaining success in 
 Innov = f (Regional specialization, Regional diversification, R&D intensity,  
                 Firm size, Autonomy,Export intensity, Manufacturing) 
(5)   13
technological terms (see Van der Panne et al. 2003). Development and production 
require technical knowledge while the successful launch of the product relies on 
financial, market and marketing knowledge. Hence, the importance of Marshallian 
and Jacobian knowledge externalities may change once the product has been 
developed and is being introduced on the market. The variables R&D intensity, 
autonomy and manufacturing are not expected to be relevant in explaining 
commercial success and are omitted. Firm size and export intensity are maintained. 
Firm size is expected to affect post-launch performance positively as large firms have 
the means for marketing and distribution at their disposal. Export intensity also affects 
commercial performance as exporting firms develop a clear understanding of foreign 
potential market demand.  Equation (6) is used to examine the impact of externalities 





5. Estimation results 
Table 2 shows the results of regional level analyses, based on equation (4). The count 
of innovating firms per industry i per region j follows a Poisson distribution, 
suggesting the use of a count data model. For reasons of overdispersion, the negative 
binomial regression model is applied instead.
6 Model 1 explains the number of 
innovators per postal code region per industry. 
 Commercial performance = f (Regional specialization, Regional diversification,  
                                                  Firm size, Export intensity) 
(6)   14
 
Table 2. Regional level analysis: externalities and innovation 
  Model 1 




PSij (specialization)  1.15* 
(1.72) 
GINICj (diversification)  1.10 
(1.59) 
COMPij (competition)  -0.34** 
(-3.99) 
FIRMSij (total firm population)
  1.85** 
(10.93) 
Log Likelihood  -1291.9 
N (98 regions • 58 industries)  5684 
** Significant at 5%-level; *significant at 10%-level; z-values in parentheses. All 
explanatory variables are standardized; estimates are heteroscedasticity-
consistent (Huber-White). 
 
The results on the product specialization coefficient PSij suggest Marshallian 
specialization externalities. Given the number of firms per industry per region, 
numbers of innovators in that particular industry and region tend to increase with 
specialization. In other words, an increase in regional specialization towards a 
particular industry positively affects regional innovativeness in that particular industry 
more than proportionally. The estimate on the GINICj variable suggests that Jacobian 
diversification externalities and more innovations also go together but to a lesser 
extent than Marshallian specialization externalities.  
Following Jacobs (1969) and Porter (1990), competition on labour demand enables 
employees to implement innovative ideas and favours the pursuit and adoption of 
innovation. This assumption does not hold for the Netherlands. The estimate on the 
COMPij variable suggests that fierce competition among firms for labour affects 
regional innovativeness negatively. Rather, this estimate is consistent with Marshall's 
(1890) argument of local market power: less fierce competition enables the innovator 
to appropriate the innovation rents. Considering that both Marshallian specialization   15
externalities and local market power act as incentives to engage in innovation, at the 
regional level, the results appear more consistent with the Marshallian than the 
Jacobian model.  
 
The regional level analysis above suggests that Marshallian externalities are 
conducive for innovativeness. To build the case for Marshallian externalities, these 
preliminary conclusions are to be sustained by similar analyses at the level of the 
individual firm. These are based on equation (5) and shown in Table 3. 
    16
Table 3. Firm level analysis: externalities and innovation 

















Model 5  
Number of 
partners††† 

















































      
Externalities:      
















      
Number of obs.  232  221  238  238 
R
2 0.71  -  -  - 
Log Likelihood  -  -145.1  -97.5  -490.8 
†      Least squares estimates (elasticities) 
††    logit estimates 
†††  Negative binomial regression estimates 
** Significant at 5%-level; *significant at 10%-level; t-values (Model 4) and z-values (Models 5 – 7) 
in parentheses. All explanatory variables are standardized; estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent 
(Huber-White). 
 
The estimates on innovative output (Model 2) suggest that Marshallian externalities 
positively affect R&D output. Given R&D inputs, innovators located in specialized 
regions tend towards increased shares of sales generated with (re)newed products. 
This suggests that, consistent with the Marshallian model, regional specialization 
improves the availability of knowledge spillovers and allows for efficient use of 
externally derived knowledge. By contrast, knowledge spillovers cannot be 
capitalized upon in diversified regions: Jacobian externalities and increased R&D 
output are not positively correlated. This relates to reduced propensities to introduce 
radical innovations (as opposed to incrementally improved products) for innovators in   17
diversified regions (Model 3). The lower propensity for firms in diversified regions to 
introduce highly innovative products is consistent with reduced propensities to 
innovate in partnership for firms in the respective regions (Model 4). One may argue 
that engaging in innovation on an autonomous basis prevents the firm from 
capitalizing on external knowledge, inducing the firm to rely on less innovative 
products. Indeed, firms in diversified regions tend towards less innovation partners, 
whereas firms in specialized regions engage in extended innovation networks (Model 
5).  
 
So far we have examined innovative output (Table 3), which indicates technological 
success but not necessarily commercial viability. In order to examine the relationship 
between externalities and commercial success, we explain post-launch performance 
with regional specialization and diversification, see equation (6). Table 4 presents the 
results using the ordered logit model (see Maddala 1986).  
 
Table 4. Externalities and commercial success 
  Model 6    Model 7 
Control variables:        
SIZE -    1.06 
(0.44) 
EXPORT -    1.23
** 
(2.18) 
      
Externalities:      








Log Likelihood  -475.3    -442.3 
Number of obs.  324    304 
 
    Two  years  after  product  launch,  firms located in diversified regions report 
positively on the product’s commercial performance more than do innovators in 
specialized regions. Jacobian diversification externalities seem favourable for   18
commercial performance. This relates to, among others, Feldman (1994) in arguing 
that the proximity of specialized business services providing knowledge on 




In this paper it is examined whether Marshallian specialization or Jacobian 
diversification externalities favour regional innovativeness in the Netherlands. 
Building on an original and highly appropriate database of new-product-
announcements in trade journals, we establish that regions endowed with specialized 
production structures accommodate more innovators than do diversified regions. In 
addition, we establish that innovators in specialized regions stand out on their 
counterparts in diversified regions. Innovators in specialized regions engage in 
extended innovation networks and report increased levels of innovation output. By 
contrast, innovators in diversified regions are less inclined to innovate in partnership 
and introduce less radical innovations. This leads to the conjecture that Marshallian 
specialization externalities favour innovativeness. However, Jacobian diversification 
externalities prove relevant as well, albeit at other stages in new product development. 
These externalities are conducive to the new products’ commercial viability. Two 
years after market launch, products introduced by innovators in diversified regions 
outperform innovations developed in specialized regions. At different stages in new 
product development, there is a case for both Marshallian and Jacobian externalities.    19
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1 Spearman’s ρ =  0.7, p-value= 0.001 
2 In addition to the Marshallian and Jacobian models, Porter's (1990) model is occasionally referred to. 
The Porter model agrees with the Marshallian model in that it asserts specialization externalities, but 
agrees with the Jacobian model that local competition rather than monopoly favours knowledge 
externalities as it accelerates the pursuit and adoption of innovation. 
3 Data provided by Marktselect plc (2002). 
4 The original Gini coefficient decreases with diversification; the complement GINIC is positively 
related to diversification. 
5 Data provided by Marktselect plc (2002) De DM-CD. Amsterdam, Applidata BV. This CD-rom 
documents information on postal code and main activity of every single firm registered at the Dutch 
Chamber of Commerce.   22
                                                                                                                                            
6 In case of overdispersion, i.e. σx > µx , the Poisson model under-estimates dispersion, resulting in 
downward biased standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). The negative binomial regression 
model addresses this issue by introducing the parameter α, reflecting unobserved heterogeneity among 
observations. 
 